We develop and analyze game-theoretic algorithms for predicting coordinate binding of multiple DNA binding regulators. The allocation of proteins to local neighborhoods and to sites is carried out with resource constraints while explicating competing and coordinate binding relations among proteins with affinity to the site or region. The focus of this paper is on mathematical foundations of the approach. We also briefly demonstrate the approach in the context of the λ-phage switch.
Introduction
Transcriptional control relies in part on coordinate operation of DNA binding regulators and their interactions with various co-factors. We believe game theory and economic models provide an appropriate modeling framework for understanding interacting regulatory processes. In particular, the problem of understanding coordinate binding of regulatory proteins has many game theoretic properties. Resource constraints, for example, are critical to understanding who binds where. At low nuclear concentrations, regulatory proteins may occupy only high affinity sites, while filling weaker sites with increasing concentration. Overlapping or close binding sites create explicit competition for the sites, the resolution of which is guided by the available concentrations around the binding sites. Similarly, explicit coordination such as formation of larger protein complexes may be required for binding or, alternatively, binding may be facilitated by the presence of another protein. The key advantage of games as models of binding is that they can provide causally meaningful predictions (binding arrangements) in response to various experimental perturbations or disruptions.
Our approach deviates from an already substantial body of computational methods used for resolving transcriptional regulation (see, e.g., [3, 10] ). From a biological perspective our work is closest in spirit to more detailed reaction equation models [5, 1] , while narrower in scope. The mathematical approach is nevertheless substantially different.
Protein-DNA binding
We decompose the binding problem into transport and local binding. By transport, we refer to the mechanism that transports proteins to the neighborhood of sites to which they have affinity. The biological processes underlying the transport are not well-understood although several hypotheses exist [12, 4] . We abstract the process initially by assuming separate affinities for proteins to explore neighborhoods of specific sites, modulated by whether the sites are available. This abstraction does not address the dynamics of the transport process and therefore does not distinguish (nor stand in contradiction to) underlying mechanisms that may or may not involve diffusion as a major component. We aim to capture the differentiated manner in which proteins may accumulate in the neighborhoods of sites depending on the overall nuclear concentrations and regardless of the time involved.
Local binding, on the other hand, captures which proteins bind to each site as a consequence of local accumulations or concentrations around the site or a larger region. In a steady state, the local environment of the site is assumed to be closed and well-mixed. We therefore model the binding as being governed by chemical equilibria: for a type of protein i around site j, {free protein i} + {free site j} {bound ij}, where concentrations involving the site should be thought of as time averages or averages across a population of cells depending on the type of predictions sought. The concentrations of various molecular species around and bound to the sites as well as the rate at which the sites are occupied are then governed by the law of mass action at chemical equilibrium:
where i ranges over proteins with affinity to site j and K ij is a positive equilibrium constant characterizing protein i's ability to bind to site j in the absence of other proteins.
Broadly speaking, the combination of transport and local binding results in an arrangement of proteins along the possible DNA binding sites. This is what we aim to predict with our game-theoretic models, not how such arrangements are reached. The predictions should be viewed as functions of the overall (nuclear) concentrations of proteins, the affinities of proteins to explore neighborhoods of individual sites, as well as the equilibrium constants characterizing the ability of proteins to bind to specific sites when in close proximity. Any perturbation of such parameters leads to a potentially different arrangement that we can predict.
Game Theoretic formulation
There are two types of players in our game, proteins and sites. A protein-player refers to a type of protein, not an individual protein, and decides how its nuclear concentration is allocated to the proximity of sites (transport process). The protein-players are assumed non-cooperative and rational. In other words, their allocations are based on the transport affinities and the availability of sites rather than through some negotiation process involving multiple proteins. The non-coopeative nature of the protein allocations does not, however, preclude the formation of protein complexes or binding facilitated by other proteins. Such extensions can be incorporated at the sites.
Each possible binding site is associated with a site-player. Site-players choose the fraction of time (or fraction of cells in a population) a specific type of protein is bound to the site. The site may also remain empty. The strategies of the site-players are guided by local chemical equilibria. Indeed, the site-players are introduced merely to reproduce this physical understanding of the binding process in a game theoretic context. The site-players are non-cooperative and self-interested, always aiming and succeeding at reproducing the local chemical equilibria.
The binding game has no global objective function that serves to guide how the players choose their strategies. The players choices are instead guided by their own utilities that depend on the choices of other players. For example, the protein-player allocates its nuclear concentration to the proximity of the sites based on how occupied the sites are, i.e., in a manner that depends on the strategies of the site-players. Similarly, the site-players reproduce the chemical equilibrium at the sites on the basis of the available local protein concentrations, i.e., depending on the choices of the protein-players.
The predictions we can make based on the game theoretic formulation are equilibria of the game (not to be confused with the local chemical equilibria at the sites). At an equilibrium, no reallocation of proteins to sites is required and, conversely, the sites have reproduced the local chemical equilibria based on the current allocations of proteins. While games need not have equilibria in pure strategies (actions available to the players), our game will always have one.
The binding game
To specify the game more formally we proceed to define players' strategies, their utilities, and the notion of an equilibrium of the game. To this end, let f i represent the (nuclear) concentration of protein i. This is the amount of protein available to be allocated to the neighborhoods of sites. The fraction of protein i allocated to site j is specified by p th protein player. The set of such strategies is denoted by P i . The choices of which strategies to play are guided by parameters E ij , the affinity of protein i to explore the neighborhood of site j (we will generally index proteins with i and sites with j). The utility for protein i, defined below, provides a numerical ranking of possible strategy choices and is parameterized by E ij . Each player aims to maximize its own utility over the set of possible strategy choices.
The strategy for site-player j specifies the fraction of time that each type of protein is actually bound to the site. The strategy is denoted by s j i , where i ranges over proteins with affinity to the site. Note that the values of s j i are in principle observable from binding assays (cf. [9] ). i s j i ≤ 1 since there is only one site and it may remain empty part of the time. The availability of site j is 1 − i s j i ≤ 1, i.e., the fraction of time that nothing is bound. We will also use α j = i s j i to denote how occupied the site is. The utilities of the site players will depend on K ij , the chemical equilibrium constants characterizing the local binding reaction between protein i and site j.
Utilities The utility function for protein-player i is formally defined as
where
j is the Shannon entropy of the strategy p i j and j ranges over possible sites. The utility of the protein-player essentially states that protein i "prefers" to be around sites that are unbound and for which it has high affinity. The parameter β ≥ 0 balances how much protein allocations are guided by the differentiated process, characterized by the exploration affinities E ij , as opposed to allocated uniformly (maximizing the entropy function). Since the overall scaling of the utilities is immaterial, only the ratios E ij /β are relevant for guiding the protein-players. Note that since the utility depends on the strategies of site-players through (1 − i s j i ), one cannot find the equilibrium strategy for proteins by considering s j i to be fixed; the sites will respond to any p i j chosen by the protein-player.
As discussed earlier, the site-players always reproduce the chemical equilibrium between the site and the protein species allocated to the neighborhood of the site. The utility for site-player i is defined such that the maximizing strategy corresponds to the chemical equilibrium:
where s j i specifies how much protein i is bound, the first term in the denominator (p 
i ensures that we cannot have more protein bound than is allocated to the proximity of the site. These constraints define the set of strategies available for site-player j or S j (p). Note that the available strategies for the site-player depend on the current strategies for protein-players. The set of strategies S j (p) is not convex.
The game and equilibria
The protein-DNA binding game is now fully specified by the set of parameters {E ij /β}, {K ij } and {f i }, along with the utility functions {u i } and {v j } and the allocation constraints {P i } and {S j }.
We assume that the biological system being modeled reaches a steady state, at least momentarily, preserving the average allocations. In terms of our game theoretic model, this corresponds to what we call an equilibrium of the game. Informally, an equilibrium of a game is a strategy for each player such that no individual has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from their strategy. Formally, if the allocations (p,s) are such that for each protein i and each site j,
then we call (p,s) an equilibrium of the protein-DNA binding game. Put another way, at an equilibrium, the current strategies of the players must be among the strategies that maximize their utilities assuming the strategies of other players are held fixed.
Does the protein-DNA binding game always have an equilibrium? While we have already stated this in the affirmative, we emphasize that there is no reason a priori to believe that there exists an equilibrium in the pure strategies, especially since the sets of possible strategies for the site-players are non-convex (cf. [2] ). The existence is guaranteed by the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Every protein-DNA binding game has an equilibrium.
A constructive proof is provided by the algorithm discussed below. The theorem guarantees that at least one equilibrium exists but there may be more than one. At any such equilibrium of the game, all the protein species around each site are at a chemical equilibrium; that is, if (p,s) is an equilibrium of the game, then for all sites j and proteins i,s j andp i j satisfy (2) . Consequently, the site utilities v j (s j ,p j ) are all zero for the equilibrium strategies.
Computing equilibria
The equilibria of the binding game represent predicted binding arrangements. Our game has special structure and properties that permit us to find an equilibrium efficiently through a simple iterative algorithm. The algorithm monotonically fills the sites up to the equilibrium levels, starting with all sites empty.
We begin by first expressing any joint equilibrium strategy of the game as a function of how filled the sites are, and reduce the problem of finding equilibria to finding fixed points of a monotone function. To this end, let α j = i s j i denote site j occupancy, the fraction of time it is bound by any protein. . . , α m ), i.e., the occupancies for all the m sites, then we can readily obtain the maximizing strategies for proteins expressed as a function of site occupancies:
, where the maximizing strategies are functions of α. Similarly, at the equilibrium, each site-player achieves a local chemical equilibrium specified in (2) . By replacing α j = i s j i , and solving for s j i in (2), we get
So, for example, the fraction of time the site is bound by a specific protein is proportional to the amount of that protein in the neighborhood of the site, modulated by the equilibrium constant. Note that s j i (α) depends not only on how filled site j is but also on how occupied the other sites are through p i j (α). The equilibrium condition can be now expressed solely in terms of α and reduces to a simple consistency constraint: overall occupancy should equal the fraction of time any protein is bound or
We have therefore reduced the problem of finding equilibria of the game to finding fixed points of the mapping G j (α) = i s j i (α). This mapping, written explicitly as has a simple but powerful monotonicity property that forms the basis for our iterative algorithm. Specifically,
We omit the proof as it is straightforward. This lemma, together with the fact that G j (1, α −j ) = 0, immediately guarantees that there is a unique solution to α j = G j (α j , α −j ) for any fixed and valid α −j . The solution α j also lies in the interval [0, 1] and can be found efficiently via binary search.
The algorithm Let α(t) denote the site occupancies at the t th iteration of the algorithm. α j (t) specifies the j th component of this vector, while α −j (t) contains all but the j th component. The algorithm proceeds as follows:
• Set α j (0) = 0 for all j = 1, . . . , m.
• Find each new component α j (t + 1), j = 1, . . . , m, on the basis of the corresponding
• Stop when α j (t + 1) ≈ α j (t) for all j = 1, . . . , m.
Note that the inner loop of the algorithm, i.e., finding α j (t + 1) on the basis of α −j (t) reduces to a simple binary search as discussed earlier. The algorithm generates a monotonically increasing sequence of α's that converge to a fixed point (equilibrium) solution.
We also provide a formal convergence analysis of the algorithm. To this end, we begin with the following critical lemma. Lemma 2. Let α 1 and α 2 be two possible assignments to α. If for all k = j, α
The proof is straightforward and essentially based on the fact that α −j 1 and α −j 2 appear only in the normalization terms for the protein allocations. We omit further details for brevity. On the basis of this lemma, we can show that the algorithm indeed generates a monotonically increasing sequence of α's Theorem 2. α j (t + 1) ≥ α j (t) for all j and t.
Proof. By induction. Since α j (0) = 0 and the range of
We extend the induction step by contradiction. Suppose α j (t + 1) < α j (t) for some j. Then
which is a contradiction. The first "≤" follows from the induction hypothesis and lemma 2, and the last "<" derives from lemma 1 and α j (t + 1) < α j (t).
Since α j (t) for any t will always lie in the interval [0, 1], and because of the continuity of G j (α j , α −j ) in the two arguments, the algorithm is guaranteed to converge to a fixed point solution. More formally, the Monotone Convergence Theorem for sequences and the continuity of G j 's imply that
Theorem 3. The algorithm converges to a fixed pointᾱ such thatᾱ
j = G j (ᾱ j ,ᾱ −j ) for all j.
The λ-phage binding game
We use the well-known λ-phage viral infection [11, 1] to illustrate the game theoretic approach. A genetic two-state control switch specifies whether the infection remains dormant (lysogeny) or whether the viral DNA is aggressively replicated (lysis). The components of the λ−switch are 1) two adjacent genes cI and Cro that encode cI 2 and Cro proteins, respectively; 2) the promoter regions P RM and P R of these genes, and 3) an operator (O R ) with three binding sites O R 1, O R 2, and O R 3.
We focus on lysogeny, in which cI 2 dominates over Cro. There are two relevant protein-players, RNA-polymerase and cI 2 , and three sites, O R 1, O R 2, and O R 3 (arranged close together in this order). Since the presence of cI 2 in either O R 1 or O R 3 blocks the access of RNA-polymerase to the promoter region P R , or P RM respectively, we can safely restrict ourselves to operator sites as the site-players. There are three phases of operation depending on the concentration of cI 2 :
1. cI 2 binds to O R 1 first and blocks the Cro promoter P R 2. Slightly higher concentrations of cI 2 lead to binding at O R 2 which in turn facilitates RNApolymerase to initiate transcription at P RM 3. At sufficiently high levels cI 2 also binds to O R 3 and inhibits its own transcription Game parameters The game requires three sets of parameters: chemical equilibrium constants, affinities, and protein concentrations. To use constants derived from experiment we assign units to these quantities. We define f i as the total number of proteins i available, and arrange the units of K ij accordingly:
where V T and V S are the volumes of cell and site neighborhood, respectively, N A is the Avogadro number, R is the universal gas constant, T is temperature, f i is the concentration of protein i in the cell, and K ij is the equilibrium constant in units of /mol. As we show in [6] these definitions are consistent with our previous derivation. Note that when game parameters are learned from data any dependence on the volumes will be implicit. For a typical Escherichia coli ( 2µm length) at room temperature, the Gibbs' Free energies ∆G tabulated by [11] yield the equilibrium constants shown below; in addition, we set transport affinities in accordance with the qualitative description in [7, 8] ,
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Note that the overall scaling of the affinities is immaterial; only their relative values will guide the protein-players. Note also that we have chosen not to incorporate any protein-protein interactions in the affinities.
Finally, we set f RN A−p = 30nM (cf. [11] ) (around f RN A−p 340 copies for a typical E. coli). And varied f cI2 from 1 to 10, 000 copies to study the dynamical behavior of the lysogeny cycle. The results are reported as a function of the ratio f cI2 /f RN A−p . We set β = 10 −5 .
Simulation Results
The predictions from the game theoretic model exactly mirror the known behavior. Here we summarize the main results and refer the reader to [6] for a thorough analysis. figure 1 does not involve time, it is nevertheless useful for assessing quantitative changes and the order of events as a function of increasing f cI2 . Note, for example, that the levels at which cI 2 occupies O R 1 and O R 2 rise much faster than at O R 3. While the result is expected, the behavior is attributed to protein-protein interactions which are not encoded in our model. Similarly, RNA-polymerase occupation at O R 3 bumps up as the probability that O R 2 is bound by cI 2 increases. In [6] we further discuss the implications of the simultaneous occupancy of O R 1 and O R 2, via simulation of O R 1 knockout experiments.
Finally, figure 1(c) shows a comparison with stochastic simulation (v. [1] ). Our model predicts that cI 2 begins binding O R 1 at the same level as [1] predicts a decline in the transcription of Cro. While consistent, we emphasize that the methods differ in their goals; stochastic simulation focuses on the dynamics of transcription while we study the strategic allocation of proteins as a function of their concentration.
